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DESPERATELY SEEKING SCIENCE
FRANCIS J. MOOTZ mI*
Like a game show contestant with a parting gift
I could not believe my eyes
When I saw through the voice of a trusted friend
Who needs to humor me and tell me lies
Yeah humor me and tell me lies
And I'll lie too and say I don't mind
And as we seek so shall we find.'
After reading the transcript of the interdisciplinary exchange between
linguists and lawyers that took place at Northwestern University last Spring,
I was left with a vivid image of the participants rising from their seats and
departing. It's a "postmodern" image, I suppose, because it derives from the
ultimate cultural kitsch in contemporary America: the daytime televised
game show. I imagined the participants wearing smiles resembling those
worn by unsuccessful game show contestants as they are ushered off stage
with a "gift" of some kind. After a period of high energy and excitement,
and with a great deal hanging in the balance, game show contestants all too
often face the cold reality that they are leaving the stage with only a gift
certificate to the Spiegel catalogue to show for their efforts. Something has
been gained, but not quite the expected payoff.
I am not suggesting that the Law and Linguistics Conference was a
failure; indeed, I found the transcript to be fascinating. Rather, I sense that
the participants must have viewed this first effort as falling far short of the
mark they had set.2 I fully expect that sustained interdisciplinary efforts
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. B.A. Notre Dame (1983);
A M (1986), J.D. Duke University (1986). I benefitted substantially from detailed written comments
regarding an earlier draft that were offered graciously by Clark Cunningham and Fred Schauer, and also
from conversations with Jim Gardner and Bruce Miller.
1. BLUES TRAVELER, Run Around on FouR (A&M Record Co., 1994). Victoria Dutcher proved
that she is the hippest person at Western New England when, after I hummed a few bars, she identified
the song and obtained a copy of the liner notes on the internet within minutes.
2. In his concluding remarks, Kent Greenawalt expressed skepticism about the prospects for
bnnging the goals of the conference to fruition:
Well, I think if a sympathetic linguist and a sympathetic law person got together and
struggled with some of the theoretical problems we're discussing now, that would be
interesting. But on the basis of this group discussion so far, I would not feel optimistic about
two people actually managing to combine to say something that was illuminating.... So at
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will grow out of this conference and that these efforts may even lead to
ground-breaking advances. An endless line of future contestants wait
patiently in the wings to try their luck, because the jackpot is so appealing.
However, it does not appear that anyone is poised to cash in just yet,
beyond garnering a few consolation prizes.
In this commentary I offer a lawyer's view of what law and linguistics
interdisciplinary studies might mean for legal practice, as well as a legal
theorist's view of what importance they may hold for jurisprudence. I do
not pretend to have more than cursory knowledge about linguistics, and so
my remarks about what linguistics scholars might gain from an interdisci-
plinary exchange necessarily will be brief and general.
I. MUTUAL INTELLECTUAL COLONIZATION OR INTERDISCIPLINARY
STUDIES?
The primary peril threatening every interdisciplinary effort is that the two
disciplines will retain their pre-conceived disciplinary self-understanding
throughout the exchange. A vital interdisciplinary encounter, it seems to
me, requires that both disciplines accept the implicit challenge to reconsider
the prejudices that help to shape their disciplinary boundaries and to
reconstruct their understanding of legitimate modes and purposes of
inquiry.3 All too often, however, what passes for interdisciplinary
scholarship involving legal theory is more akin to mutual intellectual
colonization, by which I mean the superficial convergence of two distinct
disciplines that have like-minded strategies for subjugating the other. Law
seeks out external discourses to buttress the legitimacy of its disciplinary
structure, while other disciplines seek relevance and importance within the
weighty world of legal analysis. It is not necessarily an unproductive
present, I am dubious about how useful collaboration would be, but I think that would be an
interesting article.
Law and Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 785, 969-70 (1995).
3. Robert Weisberg made this same point in his early critique of "law and/as literature"
interdisciplinary studies:
My general assumption, then, is that truly interdisciplinary study, or at least fertile
interdisciplinary study, entails discomfiture.... Whatever the specific insights, the goal of
scholarship, in [Clifford] Geertz's terms, should not be to establish "interdisciplinary
brotherhood," but to produce a "conceptual wrench," or "a sea change in our notion not so
much of what knowledge is but of what it is we want to know."
Robert Weisberg, The Law-L iterature Enterprise, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3-4 (1988) (quoting CLIFFORD
GEERr, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 23, 30, 34 (1983)). I recently discussed this issue in greater detail as part
of my contribution to an interdisciplinary round table assessing legal hermeneutics. Francis J. Mootz
III, Law and Philosophy, Philosophy and Law, 26 U. TOL. L. Rav. 127, 135-39 (1994).
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development for either discipline, but mutual intellectual colonization falls
short of what one might hope interdisciplinary studies would accomplish.
This tendency to truncate interdisciplinary exchanges is evident in the
discussions held at the Law and Linguistics Conference. The lawyers were
receptive to social scientific assistance in answering their jurisprudential
questions, but the questions were wholly determined by legal considerations
and had been formulated in response to the disciplinary forces of legal
theory long before the Conference was held.4 Conversely, the linguists
appeared eager to claim scientific status for their theories and to argue that
legal practice would be improved by paying heed to their lessons, but they
proceeded on the assumption that linguistics would intervene unscathed, as
if it had nothing to learn from legal practice.' The process of mutual
intellectual colonization is embedded in the amicus curiae brief filed by the
Law and Linguistics Consortium during the 1993 Supreme Court Term.6
Professor Cunningham evidently regards linguistics as a powerful tool for
dealing with important legal issues, while the linguists regard law as an
appropriate field for application of their theories. Law absorbs linguistics,
even as linguistics seeks to conquer law.
I should like to see a truly interdisciplinary exchange, in which the
questions that lawyers ask are reconsidered in a radical manner in light of
linguistic theory, and the scientific self-assurance of the linguists is
chastened by the reality of law as a system not only of speech but also of
action. The participants at the conference moved in these directions,
although they understandably spent much of the short period of time
learning about each other's discipline. If linguistic theory and legal theory
shake each other down to the roots by questioning the disciplinary divides,
then I believe that future interdisciplinary exchange will have far-reaching
and long-standing effects. Easier said than done (a linguist might point out).
4. Thus, Professor Greenawalt explains that he is skeptical about the potential for productive
interdisciplinary theoretical work growing out of the positions described at the conference because "it's
a disciplinary matter." Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 2, at 969-70. In other words, as they
were presented at the conference, linguistic theory and legal theory are separate modes of inquiry that
exhibit serious, if not fundamental, differences.
5 The linguists repeatedly drew the methodological distinction between the messy procedures
of legal practice (which they characterized as determining what the law is) and the linguistic questions
that arise in the course of legal practice (determining what a particular legal text means, apart from the
significance that the text may have). See, e.g., id. at 866-68, 914-16.
6. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Law and Linguistics Consortium in Support of Respondents,
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994).
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II. THE LAW'S INFATUATION WITH THE HUMAN SCIENCES
The mutual intellectual colonization at work in this exchange is played
out principally in the discussion of linguistics as a scientific discipline.
Many law professors are generally embarrassed by the weak nature of their
discipline. Normative legal scholarship often amounts to glorified advocacy
briefs that are not particularly rigorous.7 It appears unquestionable that the
rigors of natural science far surpass those of jurisprudence, but most legal
theorists regard even the human sciences as eminently more scholarly than
legal theory. This long-standing, deep-seated inferiority complex drives
many legal scholars to search for the methodological key to jurisprudential
truth by plundering the human sciences! Scholars at all points on the
political spectrum proclaim this move to be a progressive, enlightened and
realistic approach to legal problems. Economics, sociology, political
science, and even, gasp, psychology appear to be grounded in more
legitimate (read: empirical-objective) modes of inquiry than jurisprudence.'
However, legal thinkers rarely acknowledge that their deep commitment to
certain normative assumptions about the social significance of the legal
system inform their choice of a discipline (and usually a distinct tradition
within the discipline) from which to borrow rigorous methodological tools.
Because these commitments precede any explanation or critique that the
imported discipline provides, the search for broad-based, scientific and
external legitimacy falls short.
The quest for a thoroughly scientific jurisprudence unquestionably has
failed. Expert testimony is admitted liberally in litigation and frequently is
used in support of legislative and administrative actions, but the experts
never supplant the legal actors. The law uses science as it sees fit,
according to legal criteria and as decided by legal officials, most of whom
7. Pierre Schlag lambasts mainstream legal scholarship along these lines. See Pierre Schlag,
Clerks in the Maze, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 2053 (1993); Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43
STAN. L. REv. 167 (1990).
8. Because they are not trained as social scientists, lawyers often overstep their competence when
they plunder, a condition that Mark Tushnet has dubbed the "lawyer as astrophysicist" syndrome. See
Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship In
the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1338 n.140 (1979). See generally Mootz, supra note 3, at 138.40
(1994) (describing this critique of some legal theorists as voiced by several philosophers).
9. Those legal thinkers who reject the scientific assumptions about knowledge implicit in this
assessment find that their theoretical efforts are derided as amateurish subcontract work on the grand
philosophical project of Western civilization (always parochially defined, of course). Mootz, supra note
3, at 133-35 (describing the "expertise critique" of legal theory by some philosophers). See, e.g., Jules
L. Coleman, Truth and Objectivity in Law, 1 LEGAL THEORY 33 (1995).
[VOL. 73:1009
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss3/10
DESPERATELY SEEKING SCIENCE
are lawyers or defer to lawyers.1° Linguistics appears poised to follow this
pattern, with linguists offering expert testimony on discrete questions that
are framed by and assessed within the legal culture in which they arise. The
research proposal suggested at the end of the conference-using linguistic
theory to fashion more comprehensible jury instructions-is a vivid
example of mutual intellectual colonization. Linguists assert scientific
primacy, but this assertion is acknowledged only within the (much) wider
realm of legal rules.1'
The most fascinating aspect of the transcript for me was the degree to
which the pursuit of a truly scientific jurisprudence captivated the
participants, even though they knew that the prospects for such a project
were dim. At the outset, Mike Geis asserted the scientific status of
linguistics after referencing physics as a model, drawing the eager question
that the lawyers would repeat throughout the conference: "Is there any
transference of that scientific method to what we do?"'2 In an interesting
explanation of what linguists mean by a scientific theory, Judith Levi
described the transformation of linguistics after Noam Chomsky's
pathbreaking work: "We didn't just sort of write stories about language, not
even stories that we thought were fairly accurate. But we created theories
the way physicists and chemists create theories in the sense that we
hypothesize something about a set of relevant language data."' 3 This is a
particularly alluring description for many legal theorists, given the recent
insistent challenge from within their ranks that law practice and legal
theory are composed of nothing more than narratives that lack any claim
10. A good example of the use of developments in science is a case from my contracts course,
Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, State Employees' Retirement Bd., 517 A.2d 523 (Pa. 1986),
in which the court acknowledged that psychiatry's sophisticated understanding of mental incapacity
includes lack of control over one's actions in addition to lacking the ability to comprehend the nature
of one's actions, but nevertheless held that only the latter condition meets the legal test of the defense
of mental incapacity. Id. at 526-27. Even when a court conforms the legal test of mental incapacity with
contemporary psychiatric understanding of volitional impairment, the legal test inevitably remains
distinct from the scientific diagnosis. See Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460, 464-65
(N Y. 1969) (permitting a party lacking the ability to act in a reasonable manner to rescind a contract
but only if the other party had reason to know of the condition); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF
CONTRACTS § 15(l)(b) (1982) (same).
Il. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 2, at 966-69.
12. Id. at 821. Jerry Sadock later qualified Geis's comment by suggesting that linguistics is not
on a par with physics, but that it scores high on the scientific scale, perhaps higher than any other social
science. Id. at 905-06.
13. Id. at 899.
1995] 1013
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to an objective basis, subject to scientific analysis.14
The exciting prospect of importing scientific methodology to legal
analysis quickly evaporated when the lawyers learned that the linguists in
attendance perform little in the way of traditional empirical work, and that
they primarily are concerned with the conventional use of language by
ordinary speakers. 5 Bob Bennett and others argued that lawyers success-
fully communicate legal meaning despite the presence of what ordinary
speakers would regard as syntactical or grammatical deviations from
conventional usages, placing into question whether scientific linguistic
analysis is useful for real world interpretive problems arising within the
specialized community of legal speakers. 6 But the lawyers' claim to
specialized practices that supersede bare linguistic meaning triggered a
familiar rejoinder: If legal actors in fact are not playing by the objective
linguistic rules that are subject to scientific reconstruction, then legal
practice appears to be an unconstrained exercise of political power.'7 It is
only at this juncture that the normative presuppositions of the linguists
came to light: They assert the importance of their scientific analysis of
language for law because it provides the assurance of constraint that is
implicit in the rule of law virtues that the legal system purports to embody.
14. The narrative school ofjurisprudence is multi-faceted, complex, and still evolving. Overviews
of this approach include, Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994); Richard
Delgado, Rodrigo 's Final Chronicle: Cultural Power, the Law Reviews, and the Attack on Narrative
Jurisprudence, 68 So. CAL. L. REV. 545 (1995); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories
Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993); and Mark Tushnet, The
Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEo. L.J. 251 (1992).
15. Even when linguists empirically investigate the uses of a word or phrase, the research is
designed to uncover conventional uses of language by designated "ordinary" speakers. See Clark D.
Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning andHard Cases, 103 YALE L.J 1561, 1596-1613 (1994) (describing
an empirical analysis of the word "enterprise" by looking at its use in publications contained in the
Nexis database and by surveying university students with a questionnaire).
16. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 2, at 865-69. Fred Schauer summarized this point
nicely: "So the too easy claim that Scalia, O'Connor, Hart and Sacks and many others are making
linguistic blunders may misunderstand the background conventions that inform the kinds of statements
they are making." Id. at 870.
17. Judith Levi questions whether the practice ofjudges and lawyers ofignoring linguistic meaning
results in all legal meaning being "up for grabs." Id. at 945. Jerry Sadock asks why, in this
environment, legislatures don't pass statutes that simply say ".... you know!" and leave it at that. Id.
at 936. Jeffrey Kaplan then summarized this critique with three questions: Does legal practice suggest
that legal texts in effect have no linguistic meaning? How do legal actors determine whether the case
requires the judge to go outside the linguistic meaning of the text; and, in such cases, what constrains
the "interpretation" of the Law? Id. at 949. One couldn't ask for a better expression of the position that
the radical indeterminacy of legal texts-at least with respect to their legal significance, if not their
linguistic meaning-leaves us with nihilism.
[VOL. 73:1009
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Without recourse to scientific expertise as a guide, the linguists appeared
to be saying, you cannot successfully legitimate your practice according to
the interpretive rules that legal actors claim to follow; deep down, of
course, all lawyers know that they are correct. If legal actors do not abide
by the scientifically determined ordinary meaning of authoritative legal
texts, then what passes for a "specialized" discourse among judges begins
to look a lot like unconstrained discretion by members of a political-
professional elite."8 The conference thus reenacts the same old story of the
unfulfilled quest for a normatively justified certainty, one that most recently
has been played out in the law and economics phenomenon. Interdisciplin-
ary encounters with the human sciences leave legal scholars with a feeling
of deja vu, over and over and over again. 9
I have defended the rule of law, as it is instantiated in legal practice,
without recourse to the scientific ideal of objectivity, but I will not rehearse
those arguments here.2" Rather, I wish to emphasize that the linguists
never claimed to have scientific authority for directing legal practice
beyond the minimal expert competency on narrowly defined legal issues
18. The traditional alternative to textualisni/plain meaning-originalism---suffers the disadvantage
that there is no historical methodology that appears to be even close to the scientific status of
linguistics. Perhaps the embarrassing misuse of historical understanding by judges, lawyers and law
professors will lead traditionalists to the more "secure" linguistic foundations of the "new textualism."
It is interesting to note that the leftist critique of legal discourse may also seek to undermine the
technical, jargon-laden use of language by the profession, although the return to "ordinary discourse"
will be only the first step toward unearthing the contradictions and social ideologies reflected in such
discourse, as opposed to the celebration of existing social relations. Cf Peter Goodrich, The Role of
Linguistics in Legal Analysis, 47 MOD. L. REv. 523, 533-34 (1984).
19. This pattern has an impressive pedigree. Early in the American experience of written
constitutionalism, Francis Lieber attempted to use German hermeneutical philosophy as a source of
"immutable principles and fixed rules for interpreting and construing" the constitution. FRANCIS LIEBER,
LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS viii (3d ed. 1880). A siguificant branch of the legal realist
movement sought to supplant legal mysticism with the rigors of the social sciences. See, e.g., JEROME
FRANK., LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1931); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological
Jurisprudence (pts. 1-3), 24 HARv. L. REV. 591 (1910), 25 HARV. L. REv. 140,489 (1911). Ultimately,
Pound and Frank both disavowed strong adherence to this strategy. LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM
AT YALE 1927-1960, 43-46, 169-70 (1986). This pattern manifests itself most recently in the law and
economics movement as a "scientific" response to the collapse of process jurisprudence. See Richard
A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARy. L. REv. 761
(1987). Posner too has moved away from this position, recently declaring himself to be a "pragmatist."
Peter F. Lake, Posner's Pragmatist Jurisprudence, 73 NEB. L. REv. 545, 555.
20. See Francis J. Mootz I1, Is the Rule of Law Possible in a Postmodern World?, 68 WASH. L.
REV. 249 (1993); Francis J. Mootz III, Rethinking the Rule of Law: A Demonstration that the Obvious
Is Plausible, 61 TENN. L. REv. 69 (1993); Francis J. Mootz II, The Ontological Basis of Legal
Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas and Ricoeur,
68 B.U. L. REV. 523 (1988).
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that other social and natural scientists offer. Although ubiquitous references
to "plain meaning" and "ambiguity" in legal practice would appear to
establish that linguistic science has special significance for lawyers dealing
with the interpretation of legal texts, much the same might be said of the
importance of psychiatry to criminal lawyers struggling with issues of
"responsibility." I expect that expert testimony by psychiatrists regarding
criminal responsibility will serve as a useful model for expert testimony by
linguists. Linguists can make an important contribution, but they cannot
resolve once and for all the long-standing jurisprudential disputes about
legal interpretation.
One of the problems raised for discussion illustrates my contention. No
participant suggested that the horribly mangled prenuptial agreement
distributed by Charles Fillmore21 was linguistically pristine and hermeneu-
tically perspicuous, but the linguistic critique of the document seemed
rather beside the point in the context of legal practice. Mike Geis agreed
that the lawyers could reconstruct the legal significance of the document,
but he suggested that the unrepresented woman shouldn't be held to these
specialized meanings unless the husband's lawyer communicated the legal
effect of the document accurately and in a linguistically proper manner.22
This normative assertion-which undoubtedly would be embraced by a
number of law professors, and perhaps a few judges-derives not from the
scientific analysis of linguistic meaning, of course, but rather from wider
legal norms governing contractual obligation. Had the trial judge been
willing to accept expert testimony that the document was a linguistic mess,
this evidence at most would have proved a relevant fact for the judge to
consider when adjudicating the parties' rights and obligations as established
by governing legal norms.2 3 Consequently, Geis's assertion would have
no special force or authority for the many law professors and judges who
reject the idea that legally binding documents must either be written in a
21. See generally Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 2, at 809.
22. Id. at 931.
23. The lawyers were quick to point out that most written contracts are not understood completely
by at least one of the parties, whether or not the document conforms with all relevant linguistic
conventions. Id. at 930-31. In contract law, then, the desired legal value may not be obtained simply
by requiring linguistic clarity in complex written agreements. In fact, the opposite may be true at least
to the extent that the average person will not review a complex document to discern the admittedly clear
and precise meaning conveyed. Under the doctrine of reasonable expectati6ns, courts look beyond the
linguistic plain meaning of an insurance contract and enforce coverage when the insured reasonably
expects that the loss is covered by the policy. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance
with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REv. 961 (1970).
[VOL. 73:1009
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manner that can be understood by an ordinary person or must be explained
to the parties in such a manner.2" Linguistics does not appear to relax the
burdens of legal decision-making so much as to provide a limited amount
of relevant input regarding certain circumscribed, pre-defined legal ques-
tions.
All the talk about the scientific status of linguistics seems to reveal a
deep anxiety shared by the lawyers and a misunderstanding of the legal
process (fostered by the deceptive characterizations offered by judges and
lawyers) shared by the linguists. The practice of legal interpretation is
thoroughly infused with a pragmatics that is animated by deeply contested
issues of morality and justice; consequently, the practice might be
supplemented by linguistic science, but certainly even discrete legal
disputes will never be wholly determined by it.26 Judges and lawyers have
24. Such a rule is not unknown in the law, but it is a limited exception to the general rules of
contract interpretation. See, e.g., Miller v. Sears, 636 P.2d 1183 (Ala. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 173 (fiduciaries may contract with their beneficiaries only if the terms of the contract
are fair and the beneficiaries act with full understanding of all relevant facts and their legal rights.) Cf.
Hionis v. Northern Mutual Ins. Co., 327 A.2d 3631, 365 (Pa. Super. 1974) (holding that an insurer
could enforce an unambiguous exclusion in an insurance policy only upon proof that the insured "was
aware of the exclusion or limitation and that the effect thereof was explained to him.'), rationale
overruled by, Standard Venetion Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563, 567 (Pa. 1983)
("the burden imposed by Hionis fails to accord proper significance to the written contract, which has
historically been the true test of the parties' intentions.").
25. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 2, at 931-34. The situation doesn't change when
the issue concerns statutory interpretation rather than common law elucidation. If Justice Scalia
borrowed his analysis of the language of the statute in the X-Citement Video case directly and
wholesale from the consortium's brief, prior legal practice would remain essentially unchanged. The
discussion of the case did not sufficiently address and account for the broader point of Justice Scalia's
dissent in the X-Citement Video case. 115 S. Ct. at 473. Far from utilizing a scientific account of
linguistic meaning, such as was argued in the amicus brief filed by the Law and Linguistics Consortium,
Scalia notes what he presumes is a fact about the language of the statute in the course of a rather
complex and subtle analysis. Scalia suggests that he might be open to supplementing the linguistic
meaning of the statute by requiring means rea with respect to the pornographic nature of the material
placed in interstate commerce and then upholding this "interpreted" statute from challenge under the
First Amendment. The real disagreement between the judges voting to reverse and the judges voting
to affirm appears (to my untutored eye in constitutional matters) to be a debate about how to read the
statute in light of the respective judges' conceptions about the limitations placed on Congress by the
First Amendment. This disagreement, in turn, is shaped largely by the conflict between a political theory
that views judges as partners with legislatures in the implementation of legal norms (the "conversation"
model) and a political theory that views judges as being empowered to follow only the rules laid down
(the "rules" model). It doesn't get more pragmatic than this, despite the ostensible claims by the judges
about the linguistic meaning of the language of the statute.
26. I am convinced that expert testimony by linguists would provide evidence of far superior
probity in cases where a judge might otherwise consult a dictionary. See Cunningham et al., supra note
15. at 1614-17. My point is that I always regard a judge's reference to a dictionary definition as adding
Washington University Open Scholarship
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traditionally confiated legal interpretation and straightforward linguistic
analysis in a naive manner, but contemporary theorists have disrupted this
fanciful account by uncovering the social and political context in which
legal language is wielded.27 The law professors at the conference know
this lesson well-most of them profess it in their own work-but the
tantalizing possibility that linguistic theory might prove them wrong
appeared to raise at least a momentary hope. In the end, though, there is no
science for elucidating the legal norms that emerge and develop in the
course of legal practice."
111. LEGAL INTERPRETATION AND LINGUISTICS
My assessment has been critical up to this point. I have argued that
interdisciplinary studies often amount to mutual intellectual colonization,
and that this tendency is revealed when initial claims about the scientific
status and methodological superiority of linguistics are followed by an
absorption of the science as a limited supplement to legal practice. I now
wish to describe more fully my initial thoughts about a positive program
for an interdisciplinary exchange between law and linguistics.
On a personal level, I believe that exposure to linguistic theory would
benefit my scholarship. In a series of articles, I have attempted to marry
lessons from contemporary hermeneutical philosophy with the experience
of legal practice, rejecting both the comforting belief in foundational legal
norms explicated by formalistic reasoning and the disturbing belief in the
absence of coherence and reasoning in legal practice.29 Because I am
interested in the activity of language and do not focus solely on legal
questions, 0 linguistic theory would complement my research project. I
very little, if anything, to the legal analysis in the opinion.
27. Goodrich, supra note 18.
28. Consider the review essay recently published by the Yale Law Journal that spurred the
conference, in which the four authors survey the scholarly debate over the "new textualism" in statutory
interpretation and then admit that their "essay does not address these difficult jurisprudential issues.
Rather, it explores what assistance linguistics can give to a judge to the extent she choosesfor whatever
reason to use the ordinary language meaning of a text to guide her decisionmaking." Cunningham et
al., supra note 15, at 1565 (emphasis supplied). At worst, this project is premised on a tautolo-
gy-judges willing to enforce a statute according to a linguist's assessment of what the statute would
mean to an "ordinary" speaker will be assisted by linguistic science. At best, this project suggests that
a plain meaning approach might prove to be more acceptable once judges understand the contributions
that linguistics can make to this methodology of decision-making.
29. See supra note 15.
30. Philosophical hermeneutics regards language as our openness to the world, and therefore as
a unitary (though dynamic and historical) ground of meaning.
[VCOL. 73:1009
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invite and certainly would benefit from a critique provided by linguistic
theory, as I expect that it would lead me to regard my previous work in a
different, more illuminating light. I am no less susceptible than other
scholars to the aggrandizing attitude of colonization that immediately
brackets different approaches and views them through previously ground
lenses, but I hope that I would remain as open as possible to the challenges
posed by linguistic theory.
More generally, the contours of future productive interdisciplinary work
can be discerned in the transcript. At the least productive level, linguistic
theory could prove to be a suitable polemical target for non-traditional legal
theorists who might deride it as an example of scientistic methodology that
fails to add anything useful to legal understanding. As Judith Levi
remarked at the close of the conference, some benefit might be gained by
identifying the irreconcilable differences between the disciplines." These
differences likely would center around the contrast of linguistics as a
Language is not just one of man's possessions in the world; rather on it depends the fact that
man has a world at all.
To live in a linguistic world, as one does as a member of a linguistic community, does not
mean that one is placed in an environment as animals are. We cannot see a linguistic world
from above in this way, for there is no point of view outside the experience of the world in
language from which it could become an object.
HANS-GEORo GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 443, 452 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall
trans, 2d rev. ed. 1992) (1960). As the leading contemporary hermeneutic philosopher, Gadamer has
spent his long career investigating the experience of meaning within different traditions of inquiry and
understanding in order to elucidate what he terms our "hermeneutical situation." Gadamer argues that
literature, aesthetics, theology, science, law, ethics, and other modes of experience each reveal
something about the truth of understanding, a truth that is not captured by any disciplinary
methodology, nor even by the totality of the methodological attitude that animates the sciences.
No doubt the problem of language has attained a central position within the philosophy of our
century. It has a position that is congruent neither with the older tradition of Humboldt's
language philosophy nor with the comprehensive claims of the general science of language
or linguistics. To some extent we owe this to the reaeknowledgment of the practical life world
that has taken place on the one hand within phenomerological research and on the other
within the Anglo-Saxon pragmatic tradition of thought. With the thematization of language
as it belongs indissolubly to the human life world, a new basis for the old metaphysical
question about the whole seems to be available. In this context language is not a mere
instrument or a special capacity with which humanity is endowed; rather it is the medium in
which we live from the outset as social natures and which holds open the totality within
which we live our lives. Orientation toward the whole: some such reality resides in language
but not as long as one is dealing with the monological modes of speech of scientific sign
systems, which are exhaustively determined by the research area being designated in any
given case.
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Science and Philosophy, in REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE 4 (Frederick G.
Lawrence trans., 1981).
31. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 2, at 970.
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verifiable scientific inquiry and law as an exercise of moral-political
judgment.32 Bill Eskridge's scholarship describes a similar demarcation,
and he concludes that the continuing pretense of obeisance to linguistic
meaning by legal actors is an inexplicable mystery.33
However, linguistic theory can and should serve a more vital function
than providing new fodder for long-standing jurisprudential arguments.
Features of a robust interdisciplinary effort can be reconstructed from some
of the positions taken by the participants at the conference by demonstrat-
ing how the practitioners in each discipline might be challenged to entertain
discomfiting thoughts.
Georgia Green's suggestion that linguistics may soon be regarded wholly
in terms of pragmatics, although vigorously challenged by other linguists,
provides an interesting point of entry for interdisciplinary studies.3 1 If
Green and other linguists are moving to the view that language has
meaning only in its use within a context, law certainly provides an
exemplary focus for describing how and why this might be so. I do not
find the linguists' claim that legal practice is different than ordinary
communication because of its substantial effects on persons to be very
persuasive.35 Indeed, legal discourse seems to provide only a particularly
strong example of how language operates within dysfunctional families,
corporate culture, long-term intimate relationships and other venues, since
they all involve thick, historical settings in which language is used. Of
32. Compare Michael Moore's comment, Law andLinguistics Conference, supra note 2, at 855-56
("I think it's fruitful to distinguish our moral knowledge about the values that ... a statute can
intelligibly serve from the semantics of what the words mean.") with Judith Levi's comment, id. at 868
(A statute is "a social act, it's a political act, it's a legal act with legal force and linguists don't talk
about legal force. We shouldn't. We talk about language.").
33. Id. at 893-94. Cf. id. at 950 (Fred Schauer agreeing that current judicial practice permits
interpretations of statutes that the words cannot bear, despite their claims of working within linguistic
constraints). On this level, then, traditional legal theory and its purported respect for "plain meaning"
in legal interpretation would present a polemical target for linguistic scholars. This project would be
quite straightforward: linguists would demonstrate that judges claiming to enforce the ordinary and plain
meaning of legal texts often do not succeed. See LAWRENCE SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 11
(1993) ("Throughout this book, we will see how judges resort to linguistic argumentation that either
falls hopelessly flat, collapsing into incoherence, or can best be seen as window dressing, part of an
effort to mask some other agenda that is at the root of the judge's opinion."). My reading of Solan's
thesis is not that he seeks to make judges better linguists, but rather that he seeks to challenge judges
to defend their practice without the pretense that linguistic science determines their decisions. Id. at 186
("Interpretive principles do not make good legal principles.').
34. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 2, at 828-30, 838.
35. Judith Levi suggested that the problem of cumulative interpretations over long periods of time
has not been explored in linguistic theory because "[tihere is something so unique to the legal system
about this problem-that it's consequential, that it has third party effects and so forth." Id. at 921.
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course, I could be completely wrong, but explaining why I am wrong might
provoke interesting debate.
Additionally, the increasing emphasis on pragmatics by some linguists
appears to parallel the movement in legal theory from conceptual formalism
to a realistic account of legal practice. The linguists' description of the
scientific nature of their discipline sounds very much like Langdell's effort
to define a scientific manner of legal study. 6 Langdell too thought that he
could review the relevant data (the decided cases), discern the implicit
conceptual structure of the discourse, and then adjudicate which of the
samples exhibit correct moves within the discourse and which samples
exhibit discursive errors.37 The conventions are strong enough in many
situations to lend the appearance that this is possible, but the common
law-and language generally-is in flux and cannot be formalized on the
edges. Developing comparative disciplinary histories might reveal some
interesting linkages and common themes, and perhaps might lead to a
deeper understanding of broad intellectual adjustments that have shaped
both disciplines. One such grand effort-Jfirgen Habermas's attempt to
delineate a "universal pragmatics" that grounds social theory and cri-
tique-already draws law and linguistics within its ambit.38
36. See C.C. LANGDELL, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1879).
37. Id. at ix.
38. See Jirgen Habermas, What is Universal Pragmatics?, in COMMUNICATION AND THE
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 1-68 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1979) (1976). For a recent assessment, see
Albrecht Wellmer, What is a Pragmatic Theory of Meaning? Variations on the Proposition "We
Understand a Speech Act When We Know What Makes It Acceptable," in PHILOSOPHICAL INTERVEN-
TIONS IN THE UNFINISHED PROJECT OF ENLIGHTENMENT 171-219 (William Rehg trans., Axel Honneth
et al. eds., 1992).
Habermas is constructing a theory of communicative rationality that expands the scope of
communicative competence beyond the bare capacity to construct or dissect grammatical sentences. He
argues that all comprehensible communications are predicated on an implicitly raised universal
pragmatic structure of claims to validity. See generally, 1 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (Thomas McCarthy trans.,
1984) ["COMMUNICATIVE ACTION"] and 2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION: LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON (Thomas McCarthy trans.,
1987) ["LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM"]. Habermas's philosophical project actively joins in the "linguistic
turn" away from the "logocentric bottleneck" of the ontological tradition of Western thought, JORGEN
HABERMAS, Metaphysics after Kant, in POSTMETAPHYSICAL THINKING: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 20
(William Mark Hohengarten trans., 1992) ["POSTMETAPHYSICAL THINKING"], by following the
contemporary shift in focus from semantic analysis to pragmatics. JORGEN HABERMAS, Themes in
Postmetaphysical Thinking, in POSTMETAPHYSICAL THINKING at 44-48.
Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech.
HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 287.
The pragmatic level of agreement that is effective for coordination connects the semantic
level of understanding meaning with the empirical level of developing further-in a manner
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On the other hand, legal theorists challenged by the different tradition of
linguistic theory might find that they see problematic issues differently. For
example, Fred Schauer repeatedly made reference to his larger scholarly
project of delineating the different institutional structures and procedures
that can be employed within a legal system, emphasizing that the practice
of moving beyond linguistic meaning in legal practice reflects a choice
rather than the nature of legal language.39 At this point, those who
emphasize pragmatics within linguistics-after having explored legal
practice as an exemplary language game-might very well criticize the
dependent on the context-the accord relevant to the sequel of interaction. How this
connection comes about can be explained by means of the theory of meaning; for this
purpose, the formal-semantic approach limited to understanding sentences has to be expanded
.... We understand a speech act when we know what makes it acceptable.
Id. at 297.
In this debate [with linguists who view pragmatics as "a complex and derivative phenome-
non" that can be traced to semantic understanding] we are not concerned with questions of
territorial boundaries or of nominal definitions but with whether the concept of the validity
of a sentence can be explicated independently of the concept of redeeming the validity claim
raised through the utterance of the sentence. I am defending the thesis that this is not possible
... the very analysis of the conditions of the validity of sentences itselfcompels us to analyze
the conditions for the intersubjective recognition of corresponding validity claims.
Id. at 316.
If the investigations of the last decade in socio-, ethno-, and psycholinguistics converge in any
one respect, it is on the often and variously demonstrated point that the collective background
and context of speakers and hearers determines interpretations of their explicit utterances to
an extraordinarily high degree.
Id. at 335.
Literal meanings are, then, relative to a deep-seated, implicit knowledge, about which we
normally know nothing, because it is simply unproblematic and does not pass the threshold
of communicative utterances that can be valid or invalid.
Id. at 337. The possibility for divergence between the literal or semantic meaning of an utterance and
the meaning that the utterance holds for the communicating parties is increased when the communica-
tion occurs within a complex social system such as the legal system.
When the speaker puts forward an assertion with a simple predicative observation sentence
in the present indicative, the reasons that interpret the truth conditions of the sentence are
typically easy to survey. When, in contrast, a court renders a judgment in a complicated
matter ... the evaluation of the validity-and thus also the comprehension-of the court
verdict.., will require knowledge of more demanding kinds of reasons. Otherwise we do not
understand what is said-not even if we understand the individual words as a result of their
frequent past appearance in other sentences.
JORGEN HABERMAS, Toward a Critique of the Theory of Meaning, in POSTMETAPHYSICAL THNKING
77-78. Habermas's effort to articulate a proceduralist account of law is premised on his belief that the
legal system is a vital nexus for the traditional lifeworld of individuals living within a political state and
the modem systems of social organization constituting that state, and is firmly grounded in his
philosophy of communicative action. See JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NoRMs:
CONTRIBUTIONs TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1995) and HABERMAS,
LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM 356-73 (a preliminary discussion of the internal colonization of the lifeworld
through juridification processes that are subject to critical analysis).
39. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 2, at 846-47, 944, 949-50.
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belief that these complex practices can usefully be termed a product of
choice. Chosen by whom? Chosen when? Chosen from among what
options? That our legal system represents the cummulative effect of
countless individual "choices" and their continuing effects is not debatable,
but this does not mean that we can choose a new approach to law if it suits
us better. As Jerry Sadock noted, the description of legal texts as "regulato-
ry variables," seems to add nothing to "ordinary pragmatic concepts" that
explain how utterances acquire their sense,40 but surely these pragmatic
principles are not chosen by the participants in dialogue as much as the
participants' choices within the practice are shaped by the pragmatically-
determined norms. Linguistics might challenge law's imperial belief that it
generates itself as if ex nihilo, by exposing that law is embedded in a
pragmatically-defined, normatively-laden tradition that may at best be
reconstructed to some degree, but never constructed anew from the level of
understanding up to the level of action.
CONCLUSION
Although admittedly sketchy, my suggestions for avenues of further
interdisciplinary work are intended to point the way toward a discomfiting
reorientation of law and linguistics. Such a reorientation would be a
significant event, although it seems evident that the United States Supreme
Court could not use this event to assist it in deciding cases. I would not
like to see the interdisciplinary exchange oriented toward immediate
payoffs in legal practice, as I fear that the impact of such a functional
approach in reality would be minimal. My theme is simple: There is no
justification for taking the envelope containing $100; instead, legal theorists
and linguists should take a real chance and choose instead to focus on
what's hidden behind the curtain. I am willing to gamble that there is more
than a consolation prize to be gained.
40 Id. at 951-52.
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